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Abstract Microcredit transactions in developing countries create risks for borrowers
that are routinely overlooked in the literature. This paper argues that common
microfinance-lending methodologies that allow lenders to collateralize loans and uni-
laterally collect this security create opportunities for malicious lenders to steal from
clients in good standing. In places where any lender can simply call itself a
Bmicrofinance institution^ (MFI), opportunistic lenders can use the halo effect associ-
ated with microfinance to encourage borrowers to make themselves unusually vulner-
able to theft. Evidence of these abuses can be seen in a case study of Uganda, where
theft and fraud by a small number of microfinance institutions created a large-scale
crisis and contributed to a precipitous decline in trust in the financial sector as a whole.
Even when it occurs only on the margins of the sector, I conclude, this type of
opportunism may have problematic implications for all MFIs and undermine efforts
to increase financial inclusion. This possibility provides a new impetus to consider
innovative regulatory approaches for microfinance.
Keywords Microfinance . Economic development . Financial supervision . Reputation .
Financial inclusion . Fraud . Africa . Uganda
What differentiates microcredit institutions from the informal moneylenders they were
intended to replace? Conventional approaches have tended to draw a bright line
between these two types of lenders: moneylenders are often characterized as greedy
and abusive, able to exploit their local knowledge to profit from borrowers with few
other options; microcredit institutions, in contrast, are typically characterized as being
intrinsically benevolent, focused on using particular lending tactics and methodologies
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to provide vulnerable populations with access to credit—and, more broadly, motivated
by an interest in expanding financial inclusion.1 Microfinance institutions are, in this
conventional narrative, essentially benevolent by definition.2
Yet, in many markets, this optimistic definition of microfinance bears little resem-
blance to the complex and chaotic Bmicrofinance^ sector as it appears to borrowers.3 In
areas where the state exerts little effective control over the microfinance sector, as is the
case in much of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia, essentially anyone can
hang a shingle and call himself a Bmicrofinance institution^ (MFI). In countries like
Uganda, the vast majority of MFIs are local organizations and individuals who have set
up MFIs as entrepreneurial ventures; there is no test of intent to do microfinance and no
supervision of micro-lenders’ behavior.
This paper argues that the policies and methodologies that encourage responsible
MFIs to lend can also enable dishonest lenders to steal under the guise of microfinance.
Insofar as contemporary microfinance is designed not only to give creditors more extra-
judicial recourse over their clients but also to encourage vulnerable borrowers to engage
with relatively new institutions and innovative lending methodologies, it can create an
environment that is ripe for these types of abuses. Worse, as long as borrowers cannot
reliably differentiate between benevolent lenders and malicious ones, the overall
reputation of the entire microfinance market may rise with the activities of the
former—only to fall on the abuses of the latter. As long as the opportunistic behavior
of a small number of lenders can undermine trust in microfinance as a whole, then the
overall costs of this malfeasance stand to go well beyond the value of the property that
was actually stolen.
I explore the observable implications of this argument in the context of Uganda’s
microfinance sector. After years of credit promotion and laissez faire policies, Uganda
has one of the deepest and most competitive landscapes for microfinance in sub-
Saharan Africa, with little effective regulation or supervision for the vast majority of
the lenders operating in the country. In this environment, some borrowers have lost
savings and property in excess of what they owed, while others have had collateral
seized even though they had not missed a payment or even received a loan. Malicious
lenders have, moreover, been able to continue to operate for remarkably long periods—
in one case more than a decade—despite well-publicized abuses and repeated efforts to
shutter them. The consequences of these problems can be seen in the precipitous
decline in the levels of trust that Ugandans report even for highly regulated financial
institutions. Rather than spurring financial inclusion, the laissez faire expansion of
microfinance in Uganda may have actually undermined trust in the sector.
This paper is organized into three main parts. I begin by discussing the existing
literature and the state of the microfinance sector. Next, I argue that conventional
1 Financial inclusion is typically defined as an effort to expand access to multiple forms of finance, including
credit, savings, payments, and insurance. See Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2012), p. 5.
2 BMicrofinance^ is often defined to implicitly or explicitly include only institutions that are licensed (or
registered) by the government, that employ some versions of these joint-liability lending methodologies and
that are interested in expanding access to various financial services, including credit, savings, and insurance.
See, e.g., Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2012), pp. 1–6; Ledgerwood et al. (2013), pp. 1–3.
3 In an effort to reflect borrowers’ experiences more closely, I define microfinance to include the activities of
any institution claiming to do Bmicrofinance^ or doing business as a Bmicrofinance institution.^ I use
microfinance, microcredit, and microlending interchangeably, though many scholars have begun to use
microfinance to refer to a wider spectrum of non-credit financial products.
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models of lending and microfinance ignore the risks that these transactions pose to
borrowers. I go on to explore the crises and allegations of malfeasance in Uganda’s
microfinance market, as well as the dramatic shift in Ugandan borrowers’ perceptions
of these institutions. The conclusion outlines the implications of this argument and
suggests one way to mitigate these issues: creating incentives for microfinance lenders
to monitor and police one another to prevent bad behavior among themselves.
Ironically, one way to reduce malfeasance among microfinance lenders may be to
incorporate some of the familiar dynamics of collective responsibility that these lenders
have long used to prevent strategic default among groups of borrowers.
Background
Microfinance is designed to encourage lending by mitigating the costs and risks of
making small loans where courts are inadequate and borrowers lack collateral. Its roots
lie in economic models that assume that borrowers are the only party to loans that can
act opportunistically by breaking a lending contract. If borrowers default, these models
suggest, then lenders generally have little recourse other than using courts to seize the
defaulter’s collateral. In the absence of these institutional protections, or where bor-
rowers lack collateral that can be attached in this way, lenders can best protect
themselves by rationing credit, or refusing to lend at the prevailing rate of interest.4
Classical microfinance methodologies reduce these default risks by disbursing loans
to groups of borrowers (often women) and preventing them from taking additional
loans until all group members have repaid. These models essentially allow lenders to
outsource screening, monitoring, and collection activities to co-borrowers who can
provide these functions effectively and at low cost to the institution.5 In this way, these
institutions are able to tap into local knowledge, relationships, and peer pressure in
ways once available only to informal moneylenders: identifying borrowers, creating
incentives for repayment, and enforcing their claims against defaulters without
resorting to corrupt, inefficient, or problematic courts. These models have been enor-
mously influential: some estimates have placed the number of global microfinance
borrowers at 100 million.6
This conventional model of microfinance suggests that competition is likely to yield a
number of desirable outcomes. The proliferation of MFIs may decrease interest rates,
encourage innovation in lending products, increase geographic outreach, and create
incentives for some institutions to redouble their focus on the very poor.7 As
microfinance expands its reach, borrowers should naturally prefer to borrow from
MFIs rather than informal moneylenders, driving badly run or potentially abusive
4 See, e.g., Greif (2006); Wydick (2008); and Ray (1998) for discussions of these dynamics in developing
countries and markets; see also Rasmusen (2007: 136-137) for a general discussion of borrowing as a one-
sided Prisoner's Dilemma, and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing.
5 There is substantial variation in particulars such as group-formation and payment sequence.
6 See Cull et al. (2009b) for an overview of the sector. Estimates of the size of the microfinance sector vary
significantly. Banerjee et al. (2015) cite the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which put the number at 137.5
million borrowers in 2010; the 2014 Microfinance Barometer placed the number at 90 million in 2012, basing
this calculation on MIXMarket data.
7 See, Cull et al. (2011), and Cull et al. (2009a). Competition may also increase interest rates in some cases, as
competition drives up the costs of screening borrowers. See Hoff and Stiglitz (1998).
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lenders out of the market. As long as these failed lenders are not accepting deposits or
intermediating savings, then these failures may actually improve the health of the sector.
Microfinance has not been without critics. There is an ongoing scholarly debate over
whether microfinance is actually responsible for the developmental gains that have
been credited to it, as well as whether it is actually associated with reduced progress in
outcomes such as children’s education.8 Various countries, including Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and Morocco, have suffered microfinance crises as the rapid expansion of
the sector led to multiple borrowing and client over-indebtedness. Microfinance col-
lection practices have come under increasing scrutiny, particularly in the wake of a
2010 crisis in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, in which a spate of borrower suicides
was attributed to microfinance loans. In most places, neither market competition nor
explicit government intervention has succeeded in eradicating moneylenders: not only
are states unable to enforce their policies, argues one scholar, but also microfinance and
informal moneylenders are imperfect substitutes, with social and political interests
leading to various market segmentations and distortions.9
Some of the most promising work on problematic behavior by MFIs has come from
qualitative research. Several scholars have detailed the gap between the benevolent
goals and descriptions of microfinance and the systematically abusive and exploitative
practices of microfinance agents, as well as pressure, violence, and abuse suffered by
borrowers at the hands of members of their borrowing groups.10 Others have explored
the degree to which microfinance relies on patriarchal mechanisms for controlling
women’s behavior, inducing repayment by appropriating existing cultural mechanisms
for socially shaming women, and the way that existing cultural power dynamics shape
patterns of financial inclusion.11
In response to these problems, policymakers, donors, and practitioners have devel-
oped guidelines for regulation and best practices in microfinance markets. Prudential
regulations, including minimum capital requirements, are designed to prevent insol-
vency and systemic failures among financial institutions. Non-prudential regulations or
Bconduct of business^ regulations,12 mandate consumer protections including the clear
communication of loan terms to borrowers, the prohibition of discrimination in lending,
interest rate caps, data protections, and ways for borrowers to lodge complaints against
institutions. These guidelines also address the problem of Bover-aggressive^ collection
practices and predatory lending, in which lenders convince relatively unsophisticated
borrowers to take on debts far in excess of what they can reasonably manage.13
Yet, many observers continue to be wary of regulation. Many weigh the relatively
small value of money stolen and clients cheated against the benefits of expanded
financial inclusion; through this lens, the chilling effect of government regulation on
credit market expansion might do more harm than good. Indeed, recent work has
suggested that burdensome regulation may lead profit-driven MFIs to reduce their level
8 Banerjee et al. (2015); Hulme (2007); Rippey (2007); and, more generally, Dichter and Harper (2007). See
Van Rooyen et al (2012) for a comprehensive review of these issues and findings in Sub-Saharan African
microfinance.
9 Tsai (2004).
10 Cons and Paproki (2008); Rahman (1999); Ganle et al. (2015).
11 Karim (2011); Mair et al. (2012).
12 CGAP (2012), p. 14.
13 See CGAP (2012), pp. 52–59; Brix and McKee (2010).
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of outreach, potentially undermining the goal of expanding financial inclusion.14
Another issue is that of supervision or the enforcement of regulations. In countries
where governments have relatively little supervisory capacity and microfinance sectors
have large numbers of otherwise unsupervised institutions, well-meaning regulations
might go ignored, or, worse, contribute to a false sense of security.15
Indeed, while these consumer protection guidelines and efforts to detail abuses are
encouraging, they do not address some of the key—and routinely overlooked—ways
that lenders can act opportunistically. While existing models have focused on institu-
tional failure and incompetence, they have, broadly speaking, not focused on the
fundamental ways that lending contracts make borrowers vulnerable to opportunistic
lenders. In fact, borrowers face risks stemming not only from the way contracts are
advertised, written, and enforced, or from the risk that institutions will fail but also from
the risk that lenders will break the contract to steal from their clients.
Theory: Lender Opportunism and Reputational Vulnerabilities
The conventional view of lending transactions suggests that they are one-sided pris-
oners’ dilemmas: lenders are vulnerable to borrowers, but the reverse is not true. In fact,
where institutions are absent or inadequate, both borrowers and lenders may be able to
act opportunistically toward one another: borrowers can default; lenders can not only
seize more than what they are entitled to after a default but also they may be able to
pursue their clients unilaterally to seize their property whether or not they have actually
defaulted. The institutions that support lending, then, enforce not one promise, but two:
the borrower’s promise to repay and the lender’s promise to leave the borrower in peace
as long as he does repay.16
Although microfinance was certainly not intended as a way to make poor borrowers
more vulnerable to their creditors, that is often the overall effect of these lending
models. By explicitly strengthening protections for lenders, these strategies inadver-
tently reduce the degree to which borrowers are protected from lender malfeasance. The
potential for this type of opportunistic theft has increased as MFIs have moved away
from joint-liability lending methodologies that required some level of group or com-
munity involvement in monitoring and collection. In the face of increasing competition,
multiple borrowing, and over-indebtedness, many MFIs have systematically begun to
accept (and, indeed, require) collateral of various types, which they will collect
themselves, extra-judicially, in case of default. In some countries, a large proportion
of microfinance loans are now made against household chattels including furniture and
livestock, deposits of money with the institution (often called Bforced^ or
14 Cull et al. (2011).
15 For example, some policymakers have recommended that Bforced^ or Bcompulsory^ savings, which I
discuss below, be held in a trust or escrow account to protect them in case the MFI fails (CGAP 2012, p. 18.) If
such a step had been fully implemented for all lenders, then it would likely have prevented the Ugandan crisis.
Yet, the Ugandan government lacked the staff and capacity to enforce such a measure across the industry:
implementing such a regulation without adequate supervision, or with unpredictable and irregular supervision,
might have left borrowers even more vulnerable to fraud as they assumed that their money was protected not
only by the benevolent intentions of the MFIs but also by government regulations.
16 See Duggan (forthcoming) for an extensive and more general discussion of this problem of lender
opportunism.
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Bcompulsory^ savings), or the property of guarantors willing to co-sign the loan. These
innovations, which help benevolent lenders efficiently recoup their money after a
default, can be used by malicious lenders to steal from clients in good standing—or
even from individuals to whom they have not yet given a loan.
Under other circumstances, such as with informal moneylenders, one would expect
borrowers to take precautions to avoid this type of abuse. They might attempt to protect
themselves by borrowing from lenders whom they knew (or knew about) or with whom
they had a social or familial relationship. Without these protections, we would expect
them to try to avoid borrowing as much as possible.
Yet, microfinance’s stellar international reputation creates a halo effect that extends
to anyone doing business under the umbrella term. Not only are borrowers more likely
to make themselves vulnerable to BMFIs^ in general, but it is difficult for them to
differentiate between benevolent and malicious microfinance providers. Among other
things, the sector’s focus on outreach and inclusion means that both types of lenders
often target individuals who have never borrowed in the past—and both are likely to be
relatively aggressive in their sales pitches. As long as borrowers cannot reliably make
these distinctions, stories of malfeasance by Bmicrofinance^ institutions may lead to a
general punishment of the entire sector, as would-be borrowers avoid MFIs and
governments enact onerous regulations.
This argument depends upon the idea that borrowers will treat MFIs as a group,
rewarding and punishing them together, rather than as individual institutions with
distinct reputations. There are, indeed, several reasons to imagine that borrowers might
conceive of these institutions as a group. While large, internationally famous
microfinance organizations have operated continuously—and under the same name—
in some areas for years and decades, in markets like Uganda this longevity is the
exception rather than the rule. Since new institutions, and, obviously, malicious
institutions, are particularly interested in associating themselves with the broader
sector’s excellent reputation, borrowers in the most chaotic areas of the sector are
among the most likely to see institutions emphasize this sectoral reputation. The media
have, moreover, tended to consistently and frequently emphasize the term
Bmicrofinance,^ even when reporting on a single institution. Finally, policymakers
and others have emphasized the unity of the microfinance movement, making efforts
to incorporate a larger and more diverse group of institutions under the microfinance
banner rather than stressing the individuality of the MFIs themselves.
Even if borrowers and the media did try to distinguish between benevolent MFIs and
malicious ones, reputation alone would not necessarily mitigate this type of opportun-
ism. As long as either borrowers or lenders can behave opportunistically, either can lie
about what has happened, and both are likely to claim that the other has cheated them.
Thus it is very difficult for third party observers to differentiate between real claims of
malfeasance and false ones. People may discount the claims of borrowers who say they
were abused, imagining that they are trying to get out of paying debts. Institutions
accused of malfeasance may successfully rehabilitate their reputations by claiming that
the problems were the result of innocent errors or single instances of fraud by individual
officers (now fired). These institutions may, moreover, argue that erroneous claims are
being made by competitors trying to undermine their position in the market. Without
some systematic means of assembling or adjudicating these claims, it is very difficult
for gossip networks of uneducated borrowers—and even for media and government
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officials—to determine which claims are true and which are false. Even if
microfinance’s general reputation has broad implications for the market, MFIs may
not be able to rely on their individual reputations to differentiate themselves from
malicious lenders.
If malfeasance among institutions operating under the microfinance banner is,
indeed, a serious problem, then why has it largely evaded the notice of scholars and
policymakers? Part of the reason is, again, definitional. As long as one’s definition of an
MFI incorporates benevolent goals, then it is tempting to dismiss malicious institutions
as, simply, abusive moneylenders or con artists who should not be lumped together
with genuine MFIs. While this perspective has theoretical merit, if it does not reflect the
way that borrowers understand which institutions are and are not Bgenuine^MFIs, then
the gap between theory and practice may create a key threat to the sector.
Scholars have also tended to overlook these issues, in part, because of a serious
selection bias in the available quantitative data on microfinance. A strong preference for
large-scale quantitative analysis has painted a somewhat misleading picture of the
industry: scholars have tended to gravitate toward professionally run institutions that
are willing to allow researchers to observe their activities or to provide large-scale
quantitative data.17 Some work has been done detailing the differences between and
potential biases within these major databases.18 There are, moreover, often enormous
gaps between the number of institutions in these databases and the number of institu-
tions in operation in many countries, and both these gaps and their implications remain
under-examined. For example, at the beginning of 2015, Bangladesh’s MIX profile
listed about 80 providers, while the country’s Microfinance Regulatory Authority listed
nearly 700 currently licensed MFIs.19 Uganda’s MIX profile listed 33 MFIs in 2015;
the most recent (2010) government census found 2257MFIs.20 This bias has significant
effects: since much of what scholars believe about microfinance is drawn from the
systematic analysis of relatively high-quality data, it is both tempting and dangerous to
extrapolate this picture to the entire industry without considering the selection biases
associated with the available data.
Microfinance in Uganda provides a particularly good case in which to explore these
issues of opportunism and reputation among MFIs. Unlike countries with strong state
institutions that can mitigate lender malfeasance, including much of Latin America,
Uganda has a court system beset by delays, a police force that has been widely accused
of corruption, and regulatory agencies with extremely inadequate resources. The
government’s encouragement of microfinance and laissez faire approach to
microfinance regulation and supervision, moreover, has created one of the most
competitive and innovative sectors in sub-Saharan Africa.
17 Databases such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor’s MIXmarket project: www.mixmarket.org
and the Microcredit Summit Campaign make much of these data publically available. See Cull et al.
(2009b) for an overview of these data.
18 See Bauchet and Morduch (2010) for a discussion of the differences in these datasets. Even here, Bauchet
and Morduch look at data on only 2072 institutions; a fraction of the total BMFIs^ in operation around the
world.
19 Compare http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Bangladesh (accessed February 2015) and http://www.
mra.gov.bd/images/Licensed_NGO_MFIs/licenced%20mfis-697%20english%20list%20as%20on%2031.01.
2015.xls.pdf (accessed February 2015).
20 Compare Ministry of Finance (2010) and http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Uganda, accessed
October 2014.
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Theft and Abuse in Uganda’s Microfinance Markets
Uganda takes a tiered approach to the regulation and supervision of its financial
institutions (Table 1). Banks and credit institutions such as housing lenders,
which are highly regulated and supervised by the Bank of Uganda, occupy the
first two tiers. The third tier, composed of so-called Micro Deposit-taking
Institutions (MDIs), was created by a 2003 act designed to allow the largest
microfinance institutions to submit themselves to full supervision in exchange
for the ability to accept and on-lend deposits from the general public. Despite
much enthusiasm for the act, which many thought would create a large super-
vised microfinance sector, few MFIs proved interested in undergoing the trans-
formation necessary to change tiers; by 2005, only four had completed the
process, at an average cost of one million dollars per institution.21 The 2003
Act, noted the Assistant Commissioner in charge of microfinance in the
Ministry of Finance, Bdidn’t work out as expected.^22
The fourth tier of the framework is a residual category that includes all other
forms of lenders, including all MFIs that did not transform into MDIs. Tier 4
lenders are formally beyond supervision by the Bank of Uganda—and are, for
all intents and purposes, beyond any effective government regulation. Leaving
tier 4 institutions unregulated was an intentional effort by the government only
Bto regulate what it could supervise^ and to Bavoid overly burdensome
regulations^ that might have a chilling effect on the growth of the microfinance
sector.23 Although tier 4 institutions are formally required to register with the
government, they can do so as moneylenders, companies, NGOs, or savings
and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), each falling under a different regulatory
purview. In practice, virtually anyone can become a Bmicrofinance institution.^
The government’s efforts to promote unbridled entry and competition were
extremely effective. In 2001, some analysts estimated that Uganda had the most
competitive microfinance sector in Africa; by 2006, nearly three quarters of all
of the microfinance institutions in the country said that they were in direct
competition with at least one other institution.24 In the same year, a census of
MFIs suggested that there were just over 800 institutions and 1200 outlets
(including branches) providing small loans, most of them clustered in urban
and peri-urban areas.25
The first ever census of Ugandan MFIs, done in 2006, illustrated how little
the government knew about the sector and how frequently MFIs were entering
and exiting the market. While initial estimates based on registration figures
suggested that 3360 tier 4 MFIs were active in the country, census agents
crisscrossing the country with global positioning devices found that only 779
21 Bagyenda (2011), p. 133. By 2010 the number of MDIs had dropped to three, after one of the original four
became a Tier 1 bank.
22 Author interview with Henry P. Mbaguta, Ag. Commissioner, Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic
Development, Uganda, Kampala, June 17, 2014.
23 Bagyenda (2011), p. 126.
24 Aggrey Rainherojon, BLargest Number of MFIs in Africa,^ The Monitor (Uganda), November 30, 2001.
2006 figure calculated from Ministry of Finance (2006).
25 Ministry of Finance (2006).
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of these institutions were, in fact, operating. The gap between the number of
registered institutions and those actually in operation was particularly dramatic
in the case of savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs): nearly half of the
1274 institutions with current registrations were no longer operating; of the
ones that were operating, nearly 20 % had been open for 1 year or less.26 A
similar census conducted in 2010 showed that 60 % of all active institutions in
the country had opened in the previous 4 years.27
In 2006, the modal MFI in Uganda was small, locally run, and operated by a
relatively inexperienced Ugandan staff. Most had four or fewer employees and were
making fewer than 100 loans per year.28 Nearly two thirds of the directors of these
institutions had fewer than 5 years of experience in microfinance, and almost a quarter
reported that they had only a secondary school education (or less)—a figure that had
hardly changed in 2010.29 More than 90 % of loan officers reported that they had
worked in the industry for less than a year. The vast majority of these institutions kept
26 Ministry of Finance (2006), Friends Consult (2007).
27 Ministry of Finance (2010), Figure 2.2.
28 84% operated out of a single branch; 75 % had four or fewer employees. Ministry of Finance (2006).
29 In 2010, 24 % of MFI managers had no education beyond secondary school. Ministry of Finance (2010).
Table 1 Financial institutions by regulatory tiera
Tier Type of institution Start-up capital
requirement?
Deposit mobilization? Number of institutions
2005 2010
Subject to Bank of Uganda supervision
1 Commercial banks Yes Yes 15 23
2 Credit institutionsb Yes Yes 7 3
3 Micro-deposit-taking
institutions (MDIs)
Yes Yes 4 3
Not subject to supervision
4 Savings and credit
cooperatives
(SACCOs)
No Noc 628 2065
Moneylenders No No 53
Companies No No 49
NGOs and othersd No No 83
Total Tier 4 779 2250
a Tier 4 figures from Friends Consult (2007) and Ministry of Finance (2010); Ministry of Finance (2006) lists
792 tier 4 MFIs. Figures for commercial banks, credit institutions and MDIs from Bank of Uganda (2005) and
Bank of Uganda (2010).
b Including Housing Finance Companies and other formal credit institutions
c SACCOs may collect savings from members and lend it to other members
d BOther^ or BNot stated^ in the Government of Uganda 2010 Census of Microfinance Institutions. (Ministry of
Finance: 2010)
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their accounts by hand; three quarters had their accounts audited by their directors or
not at all; and 16 % of all of the registered MFIs in the country did business out of the
director’s house.30 In contrast to the high repayment rates associated with international
microfinance institutions, delinquency rates among these local institutions were high:
tier 4 institutions reported that they had made 354,000 loans in 2005, of which 273,000
(77 %) were outstanding.31
Multiple borrowing became a serious problem, and Ugandan MFIs sought new ways
to protect themselves from default. 32 Many abandoned or minimized group-based
lending, focusing instead on making loans to individuals secured on chattel, money,
and titled property. Individual loans began to dominate: by 2006, nearly all MFIs in
Uganda offered individual loans, and more than a third relied exclusively on this
model.33 In the same year, about 85 % of clients borrowing from MFIs reported that
they had individual loans.34
The practice of using money as collateral created a number of opportunities for
malfeasance. Deposits taken as collateral were not regulated by the Bank of Uganda as
long as they did not bear interest and were not used to make loans. These deposits
typically came in the form of forced savings, requiring the borrower to deposit a
percentage of the principal with the institution before receiving the loan. If the borrower
failed to repay, then the institution would reimburse itself from these deposited funds; if
he repaid as agreed, then he would be free to withdraw the money. By 2003, more than
80 % of borrowers reported that they had been required to make such a deposit to
secure a loan, and nearly two thirds of MFIs reported that they collateralized loans on
this type of savings.35
Fraud and Theft by Ugandan MFIs
These lending models allowed organizations operating as microfinance institutions to
engage in frank fraud and theft, taking advantage of the fluidity of the microfinance
sector and the pervasive practice of requiring forced savings to steal from borrowers
before disappearing. In some cases, institutions operating as MFIs stole money from
borrowers without making any loans. The prevalence of this type of fraud underscores
the ways that microfinance enables opportunism by lenders, while the government’s
difficulties in mitigating these problems demonstrate some of the unique challenges
associated with regulating a sector that is so strongly associated with benevolent
ambitions.
One example of this type of fraud involved an MFI named Caring for Orphans,
Widows, and the Elderly (COWE). This organization initially appeared to be an
unremarkable NGO working in microfinance and health insurance for vulnerable
30 Ministry of Finance (2006).
31 This calculation is difficult as the relationship between disbursed loans and outstanding loans is vague.
Since few of these loans are likely to be for much more than 12 months, however, we can draw at least some
conclusions about the magnitude of delinquencies. For comparison, the regulated MFIs reported 32 % of their
loans outstanding. Ministry of Finance (2006).
32 See McIntosh et al. (2005) on the inverse relationship between competition and repayment rates in Uganda.
33 Ministry of Finance (2006).
34 Calculated from data in FinScope Uganda (2007).
35 Wright and Rippey (2003).
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populations in several areas of rural Uganda. Its model seemed quite standard: indi-
viduals paid a membership fee, a fee to enroll in the healthcare program, and a forced
savings deposit into a collateral account held by the institution, in anticipation of
receiving a loan. COWE duly registered with the NGO Registration Board of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2001, and its employees worked through local officials
and community leaders in each of the areas where it had offices. By 2002, local papers
were noting that the organization would provide microfinance loans that Bwill enable
the beneficiaries to engage in productive work and reduce poverty.^36
In April 2002, there were widespread allegations that COWE’s directors had been
engaged in fraud. The institution was accused of failing to provide services as promised
and illegally seizing its members’ deposits, and four executives of the organization were
accused of embezzling more than 200 million Uganda shillings (approximately
$100,000), largely from impoverished borrowers.37 Investigations revealed that COWE
was operating in 15 districts, even though it was only licensed to operate in three. The
Ugandan NGO board froze the bank accounts of the organization’s directors and
suspended its license. Yet, the COWE directors protested that the NGO board had acted
without a hearing, and that the board had based its action on slanderous and vengeful
allegations leveled by competing microfinance institutions and a former director who had
been refused a large loan.38 COWE won re-registration in a High Court appeal.39
Less than 6 months after COWE was allowed to resume its operations, newspapers
once again began to report complaints of fraud. COWE members in several parts of the
country complained that the organization had shut its doors and taken their deposits
without ever giving them loans. Officials estimated that more than five billion Ugandan
shillings ($2.7 million) was lost across the country, with more than 700 million shillings
(approximately $390,000) taken from widows and orphans in a single district.40 A local
paper quoted a 75-year-old widow who complained that the COWE directors should
Beither kill us or they bring back our money. I sold all my six pigs and gave the money
to the officials of COWE who promised to give me a big loan and free medical service
but I have got nothing since. They have closed all their offices.^41
Despite these well-publicized allegations, COWE continued to operate—and de-
fraud clients—for years. In 2007, 5 years after the organization had first had its
registration suspended and reinstated, COWE was accused of having defrauded a
new tranche of borrowers across the country. As these new allegations came to light,
the Minister for Internal Affairs noted that Bif organizations are registered as NGOs, it
is very difficult to pursue them.^42 His ministry had, he claimed, de-registered COWE,
but the organization had simply re-registered as a different type of tier 4 lender with no
problem.
36 Jonathan Angura, BCOWE helps orphans, elderly,^ The New Vision (Uganda), March 31, 2002.
37 BCOWE Officials’ Accounts Frozen,^ The New Vision (Uganda), July 12, 2002.
38 John Odyek and Wilsons Manyire, BCOWE Operations Illegal – NGO Board,^ The New Vision (Uganda),
May 15, 2002; BCOWE woes,^ The New Vision (Uganda), July 31, 2002.
39 BIN BRIEF: COWE case,^ The New Vision (Uganda), September 9, 2002.
40 Darious Magara, BNGOs closed over fleecing residents,^ The New Vision (Uganda), March 17, 2007.
41 S. Onyait BCOWE came to Tororo and went away!^ Letter, The New Vision (Uganda), October 21, 2003;
Abraham Odeke BTororo residents conned of sh300m, petition government,^ The New Vision (Uganda),
November 25, 2003.
42 Joyce Namutebi and Catherine Bekunda, BMPs want action on cheating NGOs,^ The New Vision (Uganda),
November 20, 2008.
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The media may be partly to blame for the fact that individuals failed to avoid
COWE, even after it had received so much bad press. As late as 2007, the largest
newspaper in the country (which had previously covered the various allegations against
the organization in great detail), described the organization as Ba charity that supports
orphans and the elderly^ without additional comment.43 Even in 2008—after the
directors of the organization had finally been arrested and the President had called
for them to be punished—the same paper reported the organization’s involvement in an
unrelated lawsuit by describing COWE as an BNGO, which cares for orphans and
widows,^ making no mention of any of the allegations or charges against it.44
In a 2014 interview, the Director of the Bank of Uganda’s Non-Bank Financial
Institutions Department was confident that some of the people who had been involved
in COWE were continuing to defraud vulnerable borrowers.45 He noted, ruefully, that his
department had no authority to supervise or investigate tier 4 lenders such as COWE, but
could only enforce restrictions such as forcing unregulated organizations to stop using the
word Bbank^ in their names.When victims of fraud wrote letters of complaint to the Bank
of Uganda, he explained, his office was forced to advise them to seek remedy in the
courts.
Crisis in Ugandan Microfinance
Although COWE was the most remarkable case of widespread theft, it was far from the
only one that received attention. In 2007, COWE and several other tier 4 MFIs—
including Dutch International, and Together Everybody Achieves More (TEAM)—
were accused of embezzling more than 11 billion shillings (approximately $6 million)
from clients, much of it deposits associated with loans.46 As public fear and anger
reached a fever pitch, the Bank of Uganda issued a statement cautioning borrowers to
avoid depositing money with unsupervised institutions: BBoU will not protect any
person who deposits money with a person who is not licensed to take deposits or who
aids and abets crime and the perpetuation of fraud in the Ugandan financial sector.^47
Several months later, the police began to investigate MFIs across the country.
Lending institutions with names like Development Scheme Microfinance Ltd.,
Support Organization of Micro Enterprises Development, Key Business
Microfinance, and others were shuttered.48 Newspapers reported that institutions had
given their clients Bthe run-around^ and refused to give them access to deposits that
they had a right to withdraw, while other clients complained that the institutions’
records underreported their deposits.49
43 Onesimus Twinamasiko, BCOWE gives items worth sh40m,^ The New Vision (Uganda), August 12, 2007.
44 Hillary Nsambu, BCourt clears ex-MP Kafiire,^ The New Vision (Uganda), January 24, 2008.
45 Author interview with Charles Owiny Okello, Director, Non Bank Financial Institutions Department, Bank
of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda, June 16, 2014.
46 Some of the embezzled money was deposited with these institutions as voluntary savings, rather than
Bforced savings,^ though the institutions’ status as MFIs undoubtedly enabled both forms of deposit-taking.
47 Joseph Olanyo, BBoU Warns on MFIs,^ The Monitor (Uganda), January 11, 2007.
48 James Abola, BMicrofinance Bodies Should Be Watched Closely,^ Opinion, The Monitor (Uganda),
September 29, 2007; Michael Ssali, BMasaka Police Close Microfinance Institution,^ The Monitor (Uganda),
October 22, 2007; Martin Ssebuyira, BKey Microfinance Customers Bitter Over Cash Hold Up,^ The Monitor
(Uganda), November 7, 2007.
49 Abola, BMicrofinance Bodies.^
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Panic precipitated mob actions against a number of lending institutions. In
Kampala, as many as 800 clients attacked a large MFI, forcing the police to
intervene and provide an armed escort for the institution’s staff. BWe want our
money back,^ one member of the crowd said: Bthese people keep on tossing us by
shifting the dates when we are to get our money, but even Bank of Uganda passed
a statement saying the unlicensed institutions were not recognized by them, so it
means we can’t get our money back.^ 50 Rumors that the MFI was under
investigation by the police were dismissed by the lender’s Chief Executive
Officer as being Bjust^ the result Bof our competitors’ malice.^51
The Bank of Uganda responded to the crisis by reiterating its advice to use only
supervised institutions. A local paper pointed out that the Bank’s response Beffectively
implies that the hundreds of MFIs that operate throughout the country can literally
disappear with depositors’ money with little worry of punitive action from anyone.^52
Many observers complained that the Bank’s actions were insufficient. Under the
headline BQuack MFIs May Throw Economy Into Chaos,^ the main independent
newspaper editorialized that the central bank Bshould have gone beyond mere warning
and directed for closure of unlicensed microfinance institutions.^53
While the immediate crisis subsided, the general issues of fraud did not. Papers
carried reports of new pyramid schemes masquerading as MFIs, asking Bhow could so
many people be duped so quickly?^ and noting that one had Bwon the public over by
marking itself as a non-profit making, philanthropic organization ‘designed to assist
marginalized and disadvantaged groups in society.’^54 Another lender opened under the
name Visa Finance, using radio advertisements to attract clients who were required to
pay a number of application fees and deposit 25 % of the value of the loan for which
they were applying. The proprietors of this institution absconded in the middle of the
night; a police investigation was obstructed by the fact that they had used only their first
names on official documents and had turned off the only cell phone they provided as a
contact.55 Several MFIs were closed for fraud in 2009, including one whose regional
offices continued to operate for more than a month after its Kampala office had been
shuttered.56
Both logistics and politics contributed to this supervisory failure. The Bank of
Uganda was not authorized to supervise or regulate microfinance institutions, and local
officials and police did not systematically ensure that unregulated MFIs were not
breaking the law. Fraud was, as a result, often uncovered only when large numbers
of borrowers began to complain to local media—and, even then, little seems to have
50 Richard Wanambwa and Joseph Miti, BAngry Customers Mob Front Page Micro Finance,^ The Monitor
(Uganda), December 4, 2007.
51 Stephen Wandera, BFront Page Management Dismisses Closure Claims,^ The Monitor (Uganda), October
3, 2007.
52 Elias Biryabarema and Walter Wafula, BDeposit cash in micro-finance at own risk – BOU,^ The Monitor
(Uganda), November 28, 2007.
53 BQuack MFIs May Throw Economy Into Chaos,^ (Editorial), The Monitor (Uganda), January 3, 2008.
54 Solomon Muyita and Pauline Kairu, BShs Two Billion Jinja Deposit Scam Heralds Return of Gift Circles.^
The Monitor (Uganda), September 25, 2008.
55 John Augustine Emojong, BMalaba Conmen Leave Locals Crying to the Bank,^ The Monitor (Uganda),
July 23, 2009.
56 Andrew Bagala, BPolice Close Three Microfinance Firms,^ The Monitor (Uganda), September 11, 2009.
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been done in most cases. Efforts to stem fraud were also complicated by the concurrent
expansion of a government lending program administered through SACCOs. New
institutions sprang up to take advantage of this money, and the number of SACCOs in
the country trebled in 4 years.57 These institutions continued to be wholly unregulated
even while operating under this government umbrella; complaints of fraud persisted,
and newspapers periodically printed stories about the arrest of SACCO directors.58
The government had long been working on legislation that would bring all tier 4
MFIs under regulation. Prior to 2008, legislators had imagined that the new law would
be SACCO-specific; after the crisis, however, they realized that this type of targeted
regulation would be Binadequate,^ since it would leave NGOs, moneylenders, and
others outside of the regulated sphere.59 By 2014, it was proposing a combination of
regulatory authorities that would manage the prudential and non-prudential regulation
of the entire sector, using access to lending from a development fund as an incentive to
submit to regulation. Yet supervising—and even designing regulation for—tier 4
institutions is, as one government official put it, Ban enormous task.^60 Indeed, at the
beginning of 2015, nearly 7 years after the government announced that it was at work
on the measure, the bill had still not been presented to the legislature.
Self-Exclusion by Borrowers in the Aftermath of the Crisis
It is impossible to know how much money has been stolen as a result of fraud by
Ugandan MFIs or by how many institutions. There are no systematic data on thefts,
complaints, or closures, and the newspaper and police reports that exist are closely
associated with moments of widespread panic. The number of people directly affected
may well not have been large: in 2009, fewer than one percent of survey respondents
reported that they had lost money to theft or fraud by an outside party or committee
member of a financial institution.61 In 2013, 10 % of respondents responded affirma-
tively to the question: BHave you ever been dissatisfied with a financial service
provider (e.g., because you were treated unfairly, you lost your money)?^62 While it
is impossible, from this question, to know how many people lost money and how many
felt unfairly treated or otherwise dissatisfied, the overall proportion of dissatisfied
clients remains small.
Yet simple calculations of the amounts of money lost may fail to capture broader
losses of trust in the financial sector as a whole. By this standard—the erosion of trust
in financial institutions—malfeasance by unregulated microfinance institutions may
have contributed to a remarkable negative shift in public perception of the sector. In
2006, before malfeasance in the microfinance industry had come to light, 57 % of
survey respondents agreed with the statement BI trust formal commercial banks,^ and
45 % reported that they trusted SACCOs (Fig. 1). Seven years later, in 2013, more than
three quarters of respondents said that they did not trust commercial banks, and more
than 80 % reported that they distrusted SACCOs. In just 4 years, between 2009 and
57 Ministry of Finance (2010).
58 Peter Nyanzi, BEU Delegation Chief Calls for SACCOs Law,^ The Monitor (Uganda), January 28, 2008.
59 Mbaguta interview (2014).
60 Mbaguta interview (2014).
61 Calculated from Finscope (2010), question D10.1 and D10.2.
62 Calcuated from Finscope (2013), question N1.9.
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2013, the number of people reporting that they trusted commercial banks declined from
more than 50 % to less than 25 %.63
In fact, in 2013 Ugandans reported comparatively low levels of trust in all types of
financial institutions (Fig. 2). It is, perhaps, not surprising that Ugandans might be
distrustful of MFIs, moneylenders, and SACCOs in light of the pervasive—and well-
publicized—misdeeds within this essentially unregulated portion of the lending sector.
Indeed, the Bank of Uganda’s statements during the crisis were designed to buttress
trust in regulated institutions and direct borrowers away from unregulated ones. Yet,
respondents report an overwhelming distrust of every single category of financial
institution, including commercial banks and micro-deposit-taking institutions (MDIs),
both of which are well-regulated and well-supervised. If malfeasance in the
microfinance sector did, indeed, contribute to these remarkable changes in public
opinion, then it may be that trust in Uganda’s entire financial sector has suffered from
the exploits of a relatively small number of con artists.
One must be somewhat cautious in this interpretation: among other things, there is a
lag between the most serious reports of malfeasance and the largest change in public
opinion. While there is relatively little change in trust for financial institutions between
2006 and 2009, which spanned the height of the microfinance crisis in Uganda, there is
a substantial shift between 2009 and 2013. Yet, such a lag might be explained by the
fact that Ugandans—and, particularly, the poor and illiterate—rely heavily on word-of-
mouth (rather than newspaper or radio reports) in assessing financial institutions.64 It is
not implausible that it could take a year or more after such a crisis for word to spread
and Ugandans to render judgment.
Moreover, the pattern of the change does not provide compelling support for several
plausible alternate explanations. For example, it is possible that the global financial
crisis, which occurred during roughly the same period as the Ugandan microfinance
crisis, precipitated a diminution of trust in banks around the world. One could also
imagine that tightened credit as a result of the global crisis might have led to a loss of
confidence in local institutions. Yet, in either case one would not expect all categories
of financial institution to suffer the same loss of trust. If the shift was the result of the
63 This is not a longitudinal survey, so this shift does not show a change in perception among the same group
of respondents. The surveys from all 3 years were, however, done by the same organization and designed to
capture the perceptions of the same broadly representative population.
Fig. 1 Trust in Banks and SACCOs, 2006–2013 (calculated from Finscope (2007; 2010; 2013))
64 Finscope (2007).
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actions of financial institutions in the USA and elsewhere, then we might expect
Ugandans to increase (or, at least, not lose) their levels of trust in indigenous institutions
like MDIs and village savings and loans. In addition, the Ugandan government was
lending extensively through SACCOs during this period. Thus, if credit restrictions or
interest rates were driving the change, then we might expect to see SACCOs suffer
much less than other institutions—and, perhaps, even enjoy a reputational benefit from
their access to government capital. Finally, Uganda’s financial sector, which saw a
series of bank failures in the late 1990s and early 2000s, weathered the global financial
crisis quite well. Indeed, a review of Ugandan newspapers during this period suggests
few explanations for this shift in trust apart from the malfeasance and dysfunction in the
microfinance sector. Rather, local news highlights the degree to which observers and
reporters continue to return to examples of malfeasance of the microfinance crisis, both
in the immediate wake of the crisis and in more recent reporting about the sector.65
This shift is not limited to reports of trust in financial institutions: Ugandans also
appear to have changed their borrowing behavior. Between 2006 and 2009, the
proportion of survey respondents reporting loans from Binformal^ lenders, a category
that here included all MFIs except SACCOs, increased from 25 to 32 %.66 Yet, in the
following 4 years, that percentage decreased to only 18 %—lower than it had been
7 years earlier (Fig. 3). This change does not primarily reflect a shift toward borrowing
from other sources: while slightly more respondents reported borrowing from banks
and cooperatives between 2009 and 2013, the largest shift is an increase in the number
of respondents who report that they are not borrowing from any source—those who
were Bexcluded^ from borrowing. Indeed, after a marked reduction in 2009, by 2013
the number of excluded respondents had returned to essentially its 2006 level.
Ugandans were not only declining to take loans from informal sources including
MFIs, but many were not borrowing at all. Whether or not this trend away from
informal finance and toward exclusion is attributable to the microfinance crisis, it is
certainly not one that proponents of microfinance hoped to produce.
In recent years, Ugandan MFIs have moved away from forced savings and toward
other forms of collateral. In 2003, 80 % of borrowers reported that they had been
required to make a forced savings deposit to get a loan; 10 years later, a minority of
65 For example: BStop Failing SACCOs—Minister Warns Politicians,^ The New Vision (Uganda), June 27,
2013; BSACCO employees flee with Sh 1.9 Billion,^ The New Vision, September 19, 2012; and BLack of
Law Hinders SACCOs Growth,^ The New Vision (Uganda), December 31, 2010.
66 Finscope (2013).
Fig. 2 Trust in lending institutions, 2013 (calculated from Finscope (2013))
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borrowers reported that they had taken loans secured against anything other than titled
land, chattel, or livestock (Table 2).67 Non-SACCO MFIs were the least likely to rely
on this Bother,^ intangible security, including forced savings, salary assignment, group
lending, or other forms of guarantee. Although this shift is not surprising, given the
trend away from group liability and the crisis associated with forced savings, it
threatens to undermine many of the goals of the microfinance movement. If one is
interested in expanding access to credit, then the fact that nearly 50 % of non-SACCO
microfinance loans are secured against some form of land title is disheartening.
Uganda’s microfinance market appears to be becoming more exclusionary across
several dimensions.
Finally, attitudes toward borrowing among the general public underscore the problematic
state of Uganda’s lending sector. In 2013, 79 % of survey respondents agreed with the
statement BI often think that I would like to start my own business, but I can’t get enough
money^—making them, presumably, potential candidates for microfinance loans. Yet,
among the group who agreed with that statement, 61 % also agreed with the statement that
BBorrowing is a risky business,^ and 69 % agreed that BI try to avoid taking loans as much
as possible.^68 Nearly all of those who said they could not get enough money to start their
own businesses agreed with both other statements. More than a decade after Uganda was
hailed as having one of the most competitive and least onerously regulated microfinance
sectors in Africa, some of the very people who seem most likely to be candidates for
microfinance loans appear to be avoiding them. After many years of empowering lenders in
an effort to mitigate problems of credit rationing, a key challenge for Ugandan microfinance
may now be to empower borrowers to overcome their avoidance of borrowing.
Conclusions and Implications
In this paper I have shown that key microfinance lending methodologies not only put
borrowers at risk, but also that unscrupulous lenders have taken advantage of essentially
unregulated microfinance markets to steal from clients. The implications of this opportu-
nistic behavior, I argued, extend beyond the specific harm to the borrowers who lost money
67 Wright and Rippey (2003), and Finscope (2013).
68 Calculated from Finscope (2013). Combining BStrongly Agree^ and BAgree^ responses. Emphasis added.
Fig. 3 Self-reported borrowing, 2006–2013 (calculated from Finscope (2007; 2010; 2013))
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and property. Insofar as these abuses have tarnished the microfinance sector as a whole in
Uganda, borrowers who could benefit from loansmay be avoidingmicrofinance altogether.
Uganda’s experience with this type of lender opportunism is far from unique. Borrowers
in several other countries have suffered similar problems with illicit collection by
Bmicrofinance^ institutions. In Bangladesh, the Bunauthorized repossession of assets, in-
cluding the very roofs off of recipients’ houses,^ is Bnot infrequent.^69 In Nigeria, borrowers
have lost money in pyramid schemes calling themselves banks.70 In China, rotating savings
and credit groups have failed as both members and group leaders have absconded with
savings.71 The South African government has explicitly prohibited MFIs from collecting
forms of collateral, like ATM cards, that make it easy for lenders to steal from borrowers
outright or to charge fees and penalties that were not outlined in the loan contract.
The alternative perspective on the risks of microfinance presented in this paper
suggests new directions for the regulation of the sector. The notion that borrowers are
vulnerable to opportunistic lenders requires a reevaluation of policies such as the
legality of unsupervised collection and the use of deposits as collateral. Insofar as
either borrowers or lenders can behave opportunistically and institutions such as courts
protect both borrowers and lenders, then policies that allow lenders to circumvent these
institutions and collect property from borrowers on their own are not necessarily the
best alternative to slow and corrupt adjudication.
While traditional regulation and supervision may be logistically prohibitive in these
markets, the peer pressure long associated with borrower monitoring in microfinance
offers a potential solution. Where microfinance models currently emphasize using joint
liability and social pressure to prevent opportunism by borrowers, similar strategies
may allow MFIs to punish fellow lenders who behave badly—or, at least, to help
borrowers identify and avoid malicious lenders. By creating incentives for lenders to
identify, screen, monitor, and punish one another, this type of regulatory innovation
may be able to harness the interests of benevolent MFIs to keep con artists out of the
sector. At the very least, it may be able to give borrowers a way to distinguish between
genuinely benevolent lenders and those who are hiding malicious intentions behind
microfinance’s good reputation.72
69 Cons and Paprocki (2008), p. 2.
70 Emma Ujah, BNDIC warns Nigerians against wonder banks,^ The Vanguard (Nigeria), September 26,
2014.
71 Tsai (2000).
72 See Duggan (forthcoming) on the way self-regulation reduced these types of abuses in the USA and Britain
in the early twentieth century.
Table 2 Percent of borrowers
reporting that they were required
to provide each form of collateral,
by institution type, 2013a
Land title Chattel and livestock Other
Bank 30 % 18 % 47 %
MDI 28 % 36 % 35 %
Other MFIs 47 % 21 % 32 %
SACCOs 29 % 18 % 41 %
Moneylender 24 % 18 % 41 %
a Calculated from Finscope (2013)
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Finally, researchers and policymakers must take a more comprehensive view of what
constitutes Bmicrofinance.^ Definitions of microfinance that focus on lenders’ motiva-
tions create an in-built selection bias in evaluations of these markets. In many places,
the modal MFI bears little resemblance to the well-run and internationally known
institutions that serve as the standard bearers for the global industry. These small
institutions are not necessarily malicious or even poorly run. The possibility that they
could be, however, along with the risks of having opportunistic lenders preying on
vulnerable borrowers, suggests that laissez faire supervision coupled with broad efforts
to encourage competition may be the wrong strategy for many developing credit
markets. The worst institutions operating under microfinance shingles may leave
vulnerable borrowers significantly poorer than they were—as well as disillusioned
with the entire microfinance movement.
This paper is by no means a condemnation of the microfinance enterprise. Rather, it
suggests that the next step for microfinance policy ought to be to identify the full set of
risks inherent to this type of lending and to consider institutional and regulatory means
of mitigating these risks. At the very least, it suggests that we ought to be more
circumspect about encouraging unregulated, profit-driven lenders to systematically
target some of the most vulnerable members of society—especially under the banner
of a Nobel Prize-winning concept.
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